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HUMANISTIC SUPERNATURALISM:  WHAT 
SHAPE ELSE HUMANISM COULD TAKE
Abstract
Many Western humanistic philosophers regard the concepts of 
humanism and supernaturalism as oppositional, and that nothing 
supernatural can be humanistic. The supernatural is made to fall 
outside the range of options that could foster realistic, reliable, or 
acceptable human relations and promote human well-being. This 
view is particularly held by philosophers who support scientific and 
atheistic humanisms. But, drawing from the indigenous religious 
and/or philosophical thoughts of the Akan people of Ghana, I argue 
strongly against the alleged anti-supernaturality of humanism, as it 
is understood by Western thinkers. I also examine aspects of Akan 
thought to come up with a comprehensive account of why 
supernaturalism could be humanistic. Ultimately, I advance that 
there exists in Akan philosophy an orientation that can properly be 
understood as “humanistic supernaturalism”.
Key Terms: humanistic supernaturalism; atheistic humanism; 
scientific humanism; Akan religious philosophy; supersensible 
world.
Introduction
Humanism is best defined as any philosophy or disposition that 
aims at promoting the well-being of human beings. Thus, humanists 
who, for instance, stress the use of science to enhance human well-
being (or to solve human problems) are said to be scientific 
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humanists; while those who find the elimination of both religion and 
belief in (a rather “non-existent”) God to be necessary for ensuring 
human centredness, this-worldliness, and the eventual promotion of 
 human well-being are called atheistic humanists.These are some of 
the many strands of humanism which are found in Western 
philosophy. Regardless of such diversity, however, the 
aforementioned humanisms share the premise that considers 
humanism and supernaturalism as opposites – supernaturalism 
being the belief in invisible beings or powers; including those 
postulated by religion, such as God. 
I reject the alleged non-humanistic nature of supernaturalism, from 
the perspective of Akan religious-cum-philosophical thought. By 
first arguing for the phenomenological if not empirically 
demonstrable reality of the supersensible world, I proceed to 
demonstrate that supernaturalism could be part of the philosophy of 
humanism – hence, humanistic supernaturalism.
The Basis of the Alleged Opposition between Humanism and 
Supernaturalism
On the assumption that belief in God (or the supernatural) is other-
worldly and inconsistent and even conflictional with humanism, 
Miriam Allen deFord advances that “Humanism….must be 
atheistic or it is not Humanism” (in Kurtz, 1973: 82). However, 
Lamont appears to supply what could be a more fundamental basis 
for the alleged opposition between supernaturalism and humanism: 
that humanism entails the use of science in the solution of human 
problems in this (physical) world (Lamont, 1957: 22; Kurtz, 
ibid:129). This choice of the scientific tool is partly due to his 
conception, and apparently to deFord's as well, of the human being 
in physical terms only. He also asserts of humanism: “this 
philosophy, of course, recognizes that vast stretches of reality 
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remain beyond the range of human knowledge, but it takes for 
granted that all future discoveries of truth will reveal an extension of 
the natural and not an altogether different realm of being, 
commonly referred to as the supernatural” (Lamont, ibid: 24). All 
this suggests that his rejection of supernaturalism is not only 
because humanism concentrates on the natural, the physical or the 
scientific, but it is partly because humanism wants to identify with 
reality, an attribute which the supernatural, in his view, does not 
have. This idea will be of much interest to me in the next section 
where I argue (to the contrary) that there is reality in a supersensible 
world system.
There is a preliminary issue to raise here: that while holding 
that nature, and for that matter reason, determines what is 
humanistic, Lamont also recognizes “that vast stretches of reality 
yet remain beyond the range of human knowledge.” At the same 
time, he conveniently takes it for granted that “all future discoveries 
of truth” will never reveal anything supernatural. Lamont does not 
develop any persuasive argument to justify why nothing 
supernatural can ever be discovered; instead, he takes it for granted. 
The difficulty is that, assuming one is not indeed aware that any 
truth related to the supernatural has ever been discovered, and at the 
same time, does not know all the things that the human being has not 
yet discovered, can he logically form an assumption out of these that 
only physical or natural truths will be discovered in future? The 
logic of his own argument does not lead to only “possible physical 
realities,” but, if he insists that it does, then, he could be said to be 
attempting to deny or limit the rational ingenuity of humans, by 
improperly claiming to indicate what humans must know tomorrow. 
The Akan Perspective of Humanism
I discuss the reality of the supersensible world, as a prelude to some 
further philosophical discussion of the relevance of the 
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supersensible world to the question of humanism in Akan thought. 
This will, then, lead me to the exposition of humanistic 
supernaturalism where I conclude that supernaturalism could be 
humanistic. 
On the Reality of the Supersensible World
(i) The Macro World:
It is held in the Akan culture that in addition to humans, natural 
objects contain spirit.  In their metaphysical thought, Akan thinkers 
also posit a world, which is both physical and spiritual. Technically, 
this supernaturalistic conception of nature and the world can be 
described as panpsychism. This is the theory that “everything” is or 
contains spirit (Gyekye, 1995:75). And, “in saying that natural 
objects contain sunsum or power, Akan thinkers mean to attribute to 
them an intrinsic property, namely, the property of activity or an 
activating principle” (Gyekye, ibid).
In Akan ontology, there is stratification of beings. For 
instance, the world of natural objects or phenomena is placed below 
humans; but immediately above humans are the living-dead 
(“ancestral” spirits), then the deities, and finally, God (Gyekye, 
ibid). It is also believed that a spirit or being of a higher level is more 
powerful and can affect other beings below it. For instance, since the 
living-dead are more powerful than humans, they could 
metaphysically cause something good or bad to happen to humans. 
Furthermore, the effect of such metaphysical action could extend to 
the physical aspect of humans too – as in physical prosperity or 
illness to a person. It can thus be said that Akan thinkers believe in 
the reality of a supersensible world.
There is a basis for the postulation of the supersensible 
world because, to begin with, it is impossible to have the kind of 
world presented above without there being a macro, universal world 
of spirit which various spirits exist in or belong to. In other words, 
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no existent can exist in nothing. By making up the macro 
spirit world, the spirits, therefore, gain a sort of common identity in 
the macro spirit being. The macro spirit world is thus a coherent 
whole consisting of individual spirits.
It may also be said that the spirits are, as distinct entities, 
naturally attracted to or drawn to one another, since they cohere to 
form the macro spiritual realm. What is meant by attraction is that 
they share a spiritual nature, and, as such, an entity easily identifies 
and affects another entity, or easily admits to get affected by another 
entity. The idea of attraction and coherence suggests a sort of 
“energy” that is present in the constituent spirits.  The “energy” 
involved, thus gives an indication of the spiritual activeness of 
constituent spirits, although not necessarily of the source of their 
potencies. However, the fact that they fit together in forming a 
spiritual unit and are attracted to one another also gives the 
impression that as individual spiritual entities, they are inter-
related; and that even if any of them is part of or is attached to a 
physical being, the interaction or contact between that spiritual 
entity and other spiritual beings, from any distance, must be a direct 
one. Moreover, an entity's relation with another, and its capacity to 
contact or be contacted by another is supposed to be permanent, by 
reason of the belief that no spirit (or that nothing spiritual) is 
perishable. All this, to my mind, shows a realm, and the way things 
systematically operate in it. This realm which comprises the spirits, 
their existence and activities, thus, constitute what can accurately be 
called “a supersensible world system”.
It is to be noted that the supersensible world is not a 
heavenly world as such, neither is it completely earthly. Part of it 
transcends the earth while the other part is earthly. In Akan thought, 
for example, the part that transcends the earth or “earthly world” is 
believed to be occupied by God, while the other part belongs to the 
deities, the living-dead, human beings and natural objects. 
However, this does not mean that God (Nyame) is cut off from the 
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earthly spirits because He is believed to have power (tumi) 
over all the other spirits, and can be felt in the “earthly realm.” Here 
on earth, although the deities (abosom) are believed to be 
completely spiritual, they sometimes inhabit natural objects, and 
can, just like the living-dead, reveal themselves physically to 
humans. This suggests that the deities and the living-dead 
(nananom nsamanfo) can be experienced in the physical realm. 
Moreover, the spirits of humans and natural objects are subsumed 
with their physical parts too. It is, thus, reasonable to maintain that 
issues about life here on earth, or even about nature, cannot just be 
physical issues only. 
There is a good case of order in the (macro) supersensible 
world. For, through spiritual means, spiritual beings influence or 
affect directly only the spiritual aspect of nature – the human being 
inclusive.  With their idea of the partial spirituality of nature and 
having such “a strong sense of unity with the rest of nature,” 
indigenous thinkers thus come to postulate that, through appropriate 
spiritual means, “the vital force which permeates all things can be 
manipulated for either good or ill” (Turnbull, 1986: 16). What is 
normally claimed by them is that this spiritual force can either work 
on its own or be manipulated by humans for good or ill. This is 
contrary to the idea held by some people that “traditional Africans 
invest objects, animals and plants with supernatural powers…” 
(Ibid: 40). This implies that while many Western thinkers and anti-
supernturalists perceive nature to be just physical, in African 
thought, nature is seen in both material and spiritual terms. Both 
realms, contrary to Lamont's view, are considered real.
(ii) The Micro World:
Hereunder, the discussion is limited to the spiritual aspect of the 
person. Akan thinkers speak of humans in spiritual terms too. Thus, 
they seem to discuss the supersensible in a micro sense. The Akan 
concept of a person, generally, is either dualistic (where exponents 
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sunsum[spirit] on one hand, and honam [body] on the other) or 
tripartite (with okra, sunsum and honam taken to be different 
entities) – Gyekye, 1995: 85, 94. But all we need from Akan thought 
is that the human being is both material and immaterial. Thus, 
humans also have a place in the macro spirit world.
The reality of a person's place in the macro supersensible 
world and of the said relationships which the entities therein have 
with one another can be explained with the example of magic. It is 
believed that a person can be harmed or fortified, even from a 
distance, with magic – especially, contagious magic. It is also 
believed that a cheated person can get the culprit seriously harmed 
by the vengeful powers of the deities – also from any distance – 
through imprecation (dua bō, in Akan). 
The Relevance of the Supersensible Realm to the Question of 
Humanism
What the above implies is that in the macro supersensible world, a 
person can be reached via his spiritual component, using the 
appropriate spiritual method. This is postulated to rationally 
account for some of the problems of humans, on earth. It is to 
indicate that some of humankind's problems are spiritual because 
apart from the fact that some ordinary persons may seek the help of 
spirits or of people believed to be in league with evil spirits, it is 
thought that in the position that they find themselves, sorcerers and 
witches are capable of killing or causing misfortunes in the lives of 
humans. The human being is, therefore, encouraged in Akan culture 
to relate ethically to fellow humans in order to reduce the risk of 
getting harmed by those he or she could hurt. Relating well with 
others also fosters good relations with such higher beings as the 
revered-dead who will in turn protect the individual from harm. The 
Akan worldview is similar to that of the Azande where it is believed 
that the sorcerer “may make magic to kill his neighbours. The magic 
will not kill them but he can, and no doubt often does make it with 
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that intention” (Parrinder, 1963: 14). And, with this idea in view, it 
becomes extremely difficult to reject, or deny the accuracy of, the 
assertion that “the sorcerer is an evil magician, who deliberately and 
consciously makes harmful potions against his fellows and is duly 
hated for it” (Ibid). In addition to magic, the activities of witches are 
postulated in the metaphysics of the Akans (Gyekye, 1995: 75). 
The Akan conception of the natural world is physico-
spiritual. This conception, therefore, makes it possible for the 
human being to have a broader view of where the problems that he 
suffers come from, and how best they could be tackled. In so far as a 
spiritual means, for example, is not confusedly sought for the 
solution of a rather physical problem, the Akan thinker would argue 
that this approach is intelligible. He is also able to explore or deploy 
the supernatural to his advantage. For, he understands that his ability 
and potency is limited in the sphere of the structured macro-world; 
and, that superior forces in this world could protect him.
Humanistic Supernaturalism
Humanistic supernaturalism is the idea that humans could look 
forward to the promotion of their well-being on earth, and not in the 
afterlife, through supernatural powers or entities. This is a natural 
consequence of the Akan worldview, as elucidated above. Since the 
natural world, just like the problems of humans, consists of both 
physical and spiritual dimensions, one wonders how effective and 
appropriate it would be to carry out Lamont's suggestion that we use 
only “science” in promoting human welfare. A difficult situation 
would arise mainly because it is just impossible to solve the 
spiritually-caused problems of humans in this world through 
science. But by solving such problems too (as it will become clearer 
in the course of this article) a person enhances his well-being. Such 
solutions would, in some cases, involve miraculous healing. 
I am aware that miracle would be rejected outright by some 
philosophers, such as Hume. In his view, one cannot attribute the 
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solution to one's problems to miracle from a spiritual 
being/power because miracles do not even exist. Hume argues that 
“...no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the 
testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more 
miraculous, than the fact which it endeavours to establish” (Hume, 
1893: 115-6). Thus, since denying an “extremely” unusual event is 
easier than accepting or establishing it, it seems that nothing will be 
accepted by him as a miracle. However, the argument for the 
existence of miracle is in some sense not really shaken by the 
concerns raised.
Hume refuses to look at the reality or otherwise of the 
testimony itself but only makes us content with that which we 
already have or know, and can explain by the laws of nature or by 
scientific theory. And, since Hume argues as if there can never be 
something true whose occurrence we are not entirely familiar with, 
and which science, now and in future, cannot explain, he could be 
understood as implying that “a miracle is an event whose great 
improbability of occurring makes it impossible in principle for it to 
occur.” I agree with Hume on the “improbability” of certain events 
if, he thinks, that is what people perceive them to be. However, the 
actual occurrence of a miraculous event is not tied to the perception 
or wishes of human beings. Nor does it compete with “regular 
events” – which one readily affirms because of one's “psychological 
attachment” to them – for credibility. Its truth is not affirmed or 
denied without recognition of its scientific unaccountability or of its 
permanent preternatural nature, else it ceases to be miracle.
It is not my intention to make an empirical case for miracle, 
except a logical one. In an event where, say, a person who is 
affiliated to or serves a spiritual being, after calling on his master, is 
able to make the pencil one is holding turn to a lizard, and is able to 
perform “a dozen or so other feats of an equally bizarre and 
'impossible' nature” (also through the same process), as well as ask 
other present witnesses to indicate some things of anomalous nature 
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intervals after his death, which accordingly materializes, 
then, if such abnormal events happen only when known spiritually 
powerful men dedicated to the service of such spiritual beings make 
such requests, then, “it would be unreasonable to look for some 
ways of modifying scientific theory to accommodate and 'explain' 
such events.” Indeed, “By far the simpler and more rational thing to 
do would be…to posit the existence of some personal or quasi-
personal being who had the capacity to understand certain human 
requests and the power to bring about the occurrence of certain 
events (normally regarded as physically impossible), in response to 
those requests.” Thus, miracle, whether from the deities or God, 
contrary to what Hume and other anti-supernaturalists might wish, 
is a possibility, at least, logically.
However, if miraculous healers, diviners or medicine men 
attribute their spiritual powers to higher beings, then, I foresee a 
situation where someone might – in an attempt to avoid the 
conclusion that these people are, as Lamont puts it, “working for the 
 welfare of humanity” (Kurtz, 1973: 129)– claim, logically, that the 
credit for their successes should rather go to the higher beings or 
spirits. The reason could be that on their own, such people are 
powerless; and, unless they successfully get into the spiritual world, 
so to speak, or be filled with the necessary spirit, it is not always 
possible for them to observe or communicate with the spirit of any 
person in order that they find him some relief. In other words, that 
even though they are equipped with special powers, they cannot (by 
themselves) have access to the inner happenings or spiritual states 
of humans. This is a fair objection; but in the manner that we do not 
immediately give all credit to the teachers of an orthodox medical 
doctor who has worked round the clock to save the life of a dying 
patient, so could be considered these people who are believed to be 
told what to do and how to get rid of problems by the spiritual 
beings. They could have chosen to be sorcerers, murderers and 
armed robbers. But for managing to be in association with good 
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superior powers – and taking the time, sweat and pain to 
respect and obey the sometimes difficult and complicated rules of 
these beings, performing all sort of rituals just for other humans to 
have some sound sleep – these people cannot be discounted. 
Moreover, the spiritual problems to which they try to provide 
solution normally leave their sufferers emotionally disturbed so 
much so that the disturbance often affects negatively their physical 
balance. So, the medicine men, diviners, miraculous healers, among 
many others, are all individuals who use supernatural methods to 
solve emotional and spiritual problems that, in some sense, also 
affect the physical part of humans. 
Indeed, if these spiritualists provide  solutions to some 
human problems in a way that people continue to ask for more, in a 
way that many Akan and, according to Gyekye, African converts to 
Christianity (and perhaps some converts to Islam too) “continue to 
consult traditional religious shrines in times of need or of personal 
or familial crises in expectation of some mystical way of fulfilling 
their needs or dealing with the crises” (Gyekye, 1996: 16) – despite 
the clarion call of science and Western-styled formal education to do 
just the opposite – then, at least, it seems that some humans 
somehow gain by their belief and  encounter with the supernatural, 
in this world. There is a logical reason for this. Given that the human 
being is intelligent and thus knows when and by what his well-being 
is enhanced, it can be assumed that he would not choose and demand 
more of that which he knows jeopardizes his interest. Thus, so far as 
he gains from these spiritualists and supernatural powers, 
supernaturalism can be said to have a place in, and not opposed to 
humanism – or in this case, to Akan humanism. Consequently, 
humanistic supernaturalism is an intelligible, useful concept. 
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Science, (Humanistic) Supernaturalism, and the Question of 
Humanism
An objection to humanistic supernaturalism could be the charge that 
since science is a yardstick for determining what is humanistic, 
nothing supernaturalistic could be humanistic (for, supernaturalism 
is not scientific). In the way that this objection stands it appears to be 
a peripheral view of the resort to science in humanism; for, it means 
more. The deeper sense of the objection seems to be the following: 
Given that reason is a person's main tool for the advancement of his 
well-being, it is assumed by scientific humanists such as Lamont 
that it is science that is rational or consistent with rationality while 
supernaturalism is not (Kurtz, 1973: 129). Thus, if science, and for 
that matter reason, is made a yardstick of humanism, then, 
supernaturalism would have to be rejected. But, the scientific 
humanist is mistaken.  First, when there is a talk of the irrationality 
of an action, the statement is made on the assumption that reason 
does not provide a basis for it. On the other hand, a supernatural 
action is the one that cannot be explained by the laws of nature or 
science. On the face of it, one would observe that the former action 
is defined in terms of rationality and the other of science – 
suggesting that the supernatural is only unscientific (but not 
irrational as the scientific humanist claims). It is agreeable, though, 
that the laws underpinning scientific actions are to a large extent 
rationally made, and thus the scientific is reducible to the rational. 
But the scientific humanist appears to confuse the parasimilarity or 
closeness in meaning between the “rational” and the “scientific” for 
their being the same, and, thus, for being the opposite of 
supernaturalism. This underscores his mistaken view that 
humanism excludes supernaturalism. Kwasi Wiredu, an Akan 
philosopher, holds a view which, if not well explained, may lead one 
to object that he shares the view espoused by the Western anti-
religionists. From Wiredu's claim that humanism, as opposed to 
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supernaturalism, is the basis of Akan morality (Wiredu, 1980: 5-6), 
one would wrongly infer that he entirely eliminates supernaturalism 
from Akan humanism. 
Indeed, reason is not always expressible in scientific terms. 
It is possible for a person to know something by the activity of his 
own mind without being able to describe what he knows in scientific 
terms, or translate it into concepts consistent with scientific theory, 
or explain it with scientific laws. Sometimes, it becomes even 
difficult for some people to make adequate linguistic expression of 
what they experience or of what they know because they cannot find 
precise conventional words to do so. An African anti-supernaturalist 
confesses: “I am disposed to suspect that the mystic is impregnated 
by a type of orientation that is extremely difficult to articulate 
conceptually on account of the dissociation of his experience from 
the conditions of ordinary thought and action.” If all this is true, 
then, we cannot help concluding that a thing may be rational without 
it being scientific, although scientific laws are rationally made. One 
must also admit that science is only one of the things that are based 
on reason. This, of course, does not rule out the fact that science also 
has some assumptions that are taken from non-scientific sources.
Science should thus be distinguished from rationality which 
drives and is the object of science. If this is not done, scientific 
humanists will continue to make the mistake of denying 
supernaturalism of rationality, while arrogating rationality to 
science, either because, they would think, science is 
interchangeable with rationality itself or that only the scientific 
could be rational.
On the other hand, a humanistic supernaturalist must not 
commit the following mistakes:
 (A) He must not advocate the acceptance of the humanistic nature 
of supernaturalism by arguing for its being scientific. He must avoid 
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justifying his position by attempting to claim that it is rather 
“Western science that cannot explain supernatural phenomena” or 
refer, inappropriately, to science as “Western science”. This sort of 
justification is often influenced by the situation that, in terms of 
achieving results, science, to some degree, shares with supernatural 
practice (particularly, in relation to rituals) characteristics such as 
repeatability as well as occasional failures. Consequently, it is 
concluded that supernaturalism is scientific only that Western 
science does not understand it. But, scientific status, I think, is not 
attained by results but by how a result is achieved; specifically, it is a 
matter of methodology. For a method to be scientific, and thus make 
the outcome too scientific, it is absolutely necessary that the object 
under investigation be subject to repeatable laboratory or physical 
testing, experimentation, and, most importantly, be a physical 
object or phenomenon. On the other hand, that which is 
supernatural, by definition, should not admit of any such method. It 
is wrong, therefore, to suggest that something could be scientific 
about belief in the supernatural. Thus, when science wrongly 
arrogates rationality to herself, anyone arguing for the rationality of 
supernaturalism should not ignorantly wallow in science trying, in 
mathematical parlance, to sub-set science with supernaturalism. 
(B) He should not argue that everything supernatural is humanistic, 
for that is factually and conceptually pestilent. Otherwise, in a 
manner that sets humanistic supernaturalism against the basic tenets 
of humanism, the scientific humanist may object that the humanistic 
supernaturalist readily takes in anything supernaturalistic, revere 
and just cling to supernaturalism as if the only place from where he 
looks for valuable things is in the supernatural realm. The scientific 
humanist might even extend his criticism to the traditional system 
and argue that (from the traditional conception of the supersensible 
world) traditional thinkers appear to have lost real touch with the 
physical world, blaming other beings and people for their problems, 
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and demonizing their own environment instead of taking steps to 
make the physical world their happiest home. And, this situation, if 
accepted, can only mean that it is illegitimate to talk of humanism in 
Akan thought. 
In reality, however, what this article has sought to do is to 
present an analysis of the world outlook as contained in Akan 
thought; that is, the Akan conception of nature which, indeed, is 
accommodative of supernaturalism. And, it is not as if this position 
was reached thoughtlessly, because, in addition to what have been 
said so far, “while at one level Africans [including Akans] treat the 
world of nature as 'natural' in the Western sense of the word, at 
another level, because of its inherent order, nature is invested with 
symbolic meaning and becomes truly supernatural. What in the old 
days Westerners took to be superstition and ignorance, seen in this 
light proves to be a highly sophisticated philosophy” (IA, ibid; my 
square brackets). Against this background, the possible objections 
of the scientific humanist would crumble for two reasons: 
First, the Akan belief in spiritual beings does not lead to the 
demonization of the environment. For, the existence of good 
spiritual entities, including God himself, is recognized. This 
recognition can, for example, be inferred from the Akan saying: 
“goodness is the prime characteristic of God”. And, according to 
Gyekye, “in saying God is good,” Akans “identify God with 
goodness itself” (1996: 9). Even individuals such as sorcerers and 
the spirits affiliated to them cannot, by the rules of logic, be seen as, 
strictly speaking, necessarily or permanently impish. This is 
because they can, but do not all the time, harm.  So, they are evil 
only when they harm, and cannot therefore be branded as anti-
goodness or anti-human. Otherwise, if Akan thinkers equate, for 
instance, “witch” to “evil”, how shall they term a “known” witch 
who leaves the goods she is selling at the market to rush a stranger 
who has been knocked down by a car to the hospital? “An evil 
good?”, “a good evil?,” or what? The logic of life is clearly 
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understood in Akan thought. Sorcerers and witches would 
be seen in the above light because it does not make sense to classify 
as worthless a good thing that comes from a source that could have 
equally visited one with a bad thing. Magic can be used in a good 
way or a bad manner, in which respective cases the user becomes a 
good magician or a sorcerer. So, a belief in magic will not 
necessarily lead to the demonization of magicians, or to a world 
situation in which magicians (and for that matter, spirits and their 
possessors) determine the human being's life – a situation which no 
humanist will tolerate.
Secondly, by believing in spiritual beings, Akan thinkers are 
not also attempting to blame others for their problems or behaving 
like people who can do nothing other than refusing to face their life 
challenges. The issue is that “people cannot afford to neglect any 
power that can influence their lives…” (Parrinder, 1967:66). The 
influence can be positive or negative, spiritual or physical. This is 
why the human being does not show indifference but takes steps to 
solve his spiritually-caused problems in this physico-spiritual world 
with the assistance of spirit beings – that is, seek solution in the 
spiritual context where they most effectively are handled.
This leads me to another possible objection by the scientific 
humanist. That, by the resort to powers of spiritual beings, the 
human being is presented as having lost confidence in himself, or at 
least, as having underrated his own capabilities as an agent with the 
potential of solving his problems through the use of his reason. And 
that, by the denial of the human being of this privilege which he 
alone enjoys among all creatures, the human being is “debased” in 
African humanism and ontology. This objection can also be raised 
in the form of a question: why, for example, is it that the human 
being is not placed at the summit of the Akan ontological ladder? To 
answer this, I should reiterate that with regard to the solution of 
human problems, Akan thinkers would not deny that by his reason, 
the human being endeavours to solve his problems. What they 
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would add is that since scientific or physical means are not 
just capable of solving some particular kinds of problem, the human 
being has rationally discovered and is making use of the 
supernatural method too. Rationality, thus, leads him to both 
supernaturalism and science. 
As for the specific charge of giving the human being an 
inferior status on the Akan ontological ladder, it may not be wholly 
correct because the stratification is just as a matter of potency, and 
neither a depiction of order of importance nor a declaration of levels 
of things that humanists should be concerned with. Akan thought 
does not make, or expect anybody to make the human being a less 
valuable being, only that his interest is best determined by a 
consideration of himself within his “environment”. It does not also 
suggest that his environment dictates the way he behaves but that 
without a life situation in which the human being is surrounded by, 
and is thus presented with, the opportunity to maintain his goods or 
improve upon himself, there will be no point in talking about human 
well-be-ing. The issue is just that the human being exists not in a 
vacuum. He exists in and interacts with nature; he is in the universe 
with other things and beings that he could greatly benefit or suffer 
from, depending on how intelligently he relates to these non-human 
existents. This, the concern of humanists should be, and not who 
occupies what position on the Akan ontological hierarchy. After all, 
what matters most in humanism is ensuring that the human being is 
not denied what good things he can or should have, or prevented 
from doing what he is capable of.
(C) In the attempt to distinguish anything African from that which is 
not, particularly from that which is Western, it appears 
understandable to look for the main feature that ideologically 
differentiates the two cultures. In terms of humanism, for example, 
this could be the idea that Akan humanism accommodates 
supernaturalism while Western humanistic thought, for the most 
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part, does not entertain it. Consequently, when it comes to the 
solution of human problems, there is a great tendency for the 
humanistic supernaturalist to push more for supernaturalism 
because, he might think, the more he does this the more recognized 
or successful the Akan case will become. Without much care, one 
can thus easily “overuse” supernaturalism: that is, apply or attempt 
to apply supernaturalism in areas it should not.
In truth, however, humanistic supernaturalism only sees a 
person as a physical and spiritual being, making it possible for his 
interest to be served in both realms. This is how it brings 
supernaturalism into humanism, confuting the supernaturalism-
humanism opposition thesis. However, what it never does is to give 
the impression that supernatural means should be adopted to solve 
physical problems – that is, those that can be explained by science – 
and vice versa. For, the human being hardly gains any good result by 
doing this. It is undeniable that it is sometimes difficult to tell which 
problem of humans is spiritual and which is not. But, if it is 
presumed by the troubled (because of the extremely anomalous 
nature, in terms of science, of a personal experience) and it is 
confirmed by someone who has knowledge of the spirit world that 
the problem which he personally physically suffers is caused 
spiritually, the person involved takes the most intelligent approach. 
He does this by seeking supernatural solution, in which he believes 
he is more successful. This is the farthest supernaturalism can go. 
You do not employ it or mention it when seeking the most effective 
means of achieving the material advancement of humans. This latter 
means is the preserve of science.
Conclusion
In order to live a life worthy of a human being, it is suggested by 
some Western humanists that the human being needs to concentrate 
on this world, by developing a good relationship with other humans 
and the environment (both of which are deemed by them to be 
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purely physical) and, more importantly, work towards the 
promotion of one's well-being and the welfare of others through 
empirical means. This article has attempted to argue for the reality 
of the supersensible world, and suggested that the partial spirituality 
of the human being and of his world, makes it possible for the 
human person to have spiritual problems. Since, as held in Akan 
thought, such problems can only be solved through spiritual means, 
the scientific method proposed by Lamont as the only method to 
rely on in solving human problems is shown to be inadequate. The 
reality of the supernatural solution of human problems in this world 
further suggests that contrary to the claim made by some Western 
humanists that humanism opposes supernaturalism, humanism can 
indeed accommodate supernaturalism. This is the basis for the Akan 
concept of humanistic supernaturalism. 
HUMANISTIC SUPERNATURALISM:  WHAT SHAPE ELSE HUMANISM COULD TAKE 
....................... H. M. Majeed, 
252
References:
Colwell, Gary. “On Defining Away the Miraculous”. Philosophy: The 
Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 57 (221). 1982: 327-
337.         
             
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande, 
NewYork: The Clarenden Press, 1937. 
Feyerabend, Paul. Science in a Free Society, London: Verso, 1978. 
Henceforth cited as SS.
--------------------- Against Method, London: Verso, 1975. Henceforth 
cited as AM.
Gjertson, Derek. Science and Philosophy: Past and Present, London: 
Penguin, 1989. 
Gyekye, Kwame. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan 
Conceptual Scheme, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1995. 
--------------------. African Cultural Values: An Introduction, Accra: 
Sankofa, 1996. 
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, and an 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, L.A. Selby-Bigge 
(ed), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893. 
Kurtz, Paul (ed). The Humanist Alternative: Some Definitions of 
Humanism, Buffallo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1973. 
thLamont, Corliss. The Philosophy of Humanism, 4  edn. New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1957.            
Parrinder, Geoffrey. African Mythology, London: Hamlyn, 1967. 
Henceforth cited as AM.                                        
253
International Journal of Religion and Human Relations. Vol.10, No.1. September, 2018

